We also find evidence that user

This may be the first paper in accounting scholarship to examine the lobbying of governmental entities in the formulation of accounting standards. Author Abstract We examine the lobbying behavior of state governments in the development of recently issued public pension accounting standards GASB and . Consistent with opportunistic motivations we find that states opposition to the liability increasing provisions embedded in these standards is increasing in the severity of pension plan underfunding state budget deficits and the use of high discount rates.

Further we find opposing states are subject to more stringent balanced budget requirements and greater political pressure from unions. By contrast we find evidence that the support from financial Poland Mobile Number List statement users for these provisions is amplified in states with poorly funded plans and large budget deficits suggesting government lobbying is misaligned with a public interest perspective.support varies by type internal users public employees overwhelmingly oppose the standards relative to external users credit analysts and the broader citizenry but the difference is moderated in states with constitutionally protected benefits. This finding is consistent with the expectation that pension accounting reform will motivate cuts in pension benefits as opposed to increased levels of funding from the governments.



Analyses of and state pension reforms confirm that states opposed to accounting reform are more likely to cut pension benefits. Paper Information Full Working Paper Text Working Paper Publication Date December Henry A. Kissinger as Negotiator Background and Key Accomplishments by James Sebenius and Laurence A. Green This paper describes three of the most pivotal negotiations of statesman scholar and public intellectual Henry A.